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AFFECTING FOREIGN AFFAIRS IS NOT THE SAME AS MAKING 
FOREIGN POLICY: A COMMENT ON JUDICIAL FOREIGN POLICY 
A. MARK WEISBURD* 
INTRODUCTION 
Professor David Sloss’s Judicial Foreign Policy: Lessons from the 1790s1 
is a fascinating and provocative account of a crucial series of events from the 
earliest days of the government established by the Constitution.  As I will note 
below, his narrative shows some of the growing pains of the federal 
government.  I have some quibbles about his evaluation of the British 
“lawfare” policy and his suggestion that judicial application of prize law in the 
eighteenth century is a significant precedent for the use of international law as 
a generator of rules of decision in the twenty-first.  However, my comments 
will focus mainly on what I take to be the most important inference he draws 
from the events he recounts: that judicial minimalism in foreign affairs is 
inconsistent with the Framers’ understanding of the Constitution, given that, 
during the period he describes, the federal Executive concluded that the 
judiciary was the department of the federal government best equipped to 
address privateering questions with significant foreign relations implications.2 
I.  A SNAPSHOT OF THE FOUNDING ERA 
Professor Sloss’s paper offers an opportunity to reflect on the way the 
founding generation understood—or came to understand—the scheme of 
government established by the Constitution.  In the first place, his narrative 
provides a fair degree of ammunition for those who doubt the utility of 
originalism as an infallible method of constitutional interpretation.  As he 
makes clear, when French privateers started making illegal captures in 1793, 
no official was certain which branch of the federal government should address 
the problem.3  The first case raising this matter was treated as an executive 
 
* Martha M. Brandis Professor of Law, School of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill. 
 1. David Sloss, Judicial Foreign Policy: Lessons from the 1790s, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 145 
(2008). 
 2. Id. at 194–96. 
 3. Id. at 152–54. 
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matter and resolved by Attorney General Edmund Randolph; subsequently, 
however, the Washington administration decided that dealing with such cases 
was a judicial function.4  This uncertainty is especially striking because both 
President Washington and Attorney General Randolph were delegates to the 
Constitutional Convention5 and Randolph was one of the members of the 
committee that produced a first draft of the Constitution.6  That is, even when 
the President and the Attorney General were themselves among the Framers, 
they proceeded under the assumption that the Constitution was unclear on this 
jurisdictional issue and determined how to resolve it on the basis of practical 
considerations as they revealed themselves. 
The situation Professor Sloss addresses also provides a glimpse of the early 
functioning of the federal judiciary.  For one thing, it makes clear that twenty-
first century ideas of the necessity of sharp limits between the Executive and 
Judicial Branches had not yet taken hold;7 it is quite striking that two treaties 
very relevant to the events of this period—the Jay Treaty of 1794 and the 
Convention of 1800 ending the quasi-war with France—were negotiated, in 
one case by the sitting Chief Justice, and in the other by a delegation of which 
the sitting Chief Justice was a member.8  Furthermore, questions raised by the 
European wars provided the occasion on which the judiciary first determined 
that it could not, as an institution, render advisory opinions.9 
II.  QUIBBLES 
As I will note in the next section, I think that Professor Sloss is quite 
correct in his observation that the French prize cases provide an important 
perspective in considering the role of the federal judiciary in matters touching 
on foreign affairs.  He makes certain other points, however, on which he places 
much less emphasis, and as to which I am uncertain.  In the first place, 
Professor Sloss calls British “lawfare” a significant hindrance to French 
privateering and suggests that cases were brought without regard to their 
merit.10  But it is not clear to me that lawfare was as unjustified, as successful, 
or as troublesome to France as he argues.  As he points out, trial judges in four 
 
 4. Id. at 161–64. 
 5. JAMES MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 53 (E.H. Scott ed., 1894). 
 6. WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 14 (1995). 
 7. See id. at 119. 
 8. Id. at 89–90, 118–19. 
 9. Id. at 77–80. 
 10. See Sloss, supra note 1, at 173–74, 182 (noting that the British “successfully utilized” 
lawfare against the French by filing claims in U.S. courts in order to interfere with France’s 
military objectives and to prevent the privateers from collecting profits on their prizes, and 
suggesting that the fact that the majority of the cases were decided in favor of the privateers 
“lends credence to the French allegation that these were frivolous lawsuits”). 
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of the eighteen cases he identifies held against the captors.11  That suggests 
some basis for the suits.  Also, a study of these events indicates that, in the 
period prior to the spring of 1795, French privateers based in Charleston, S.C., 
had brought into port thirty-seven English prizes (as well as twenty-nine of 
other nationalities), which were sold for something over £66,000—a total 
which, of course, does not count prizes taken to other American ports.12  If 
privateers were able to realize a sum of this magnitude from the sale of their 
prizes, it cannot be true that they were completely hamstrung by the British 
legal maneuvers, or that those maneuvers gave as much protection to British 
ships as their proponents may have claimed.  Further, it should be noted that 
the British consul whom Professor Sloss quotes as extolling the effect of 
British lawfare13 was involved in the bringing of the suits challenging the 
legality of the French captures, and thus had every reason to praise the 
consequences of his resort to litigation.14 
I have a second quibble regarding Professor Sloss’s observation that these 
cases involve judicial recognition of private rights created by international 
law.15  He is certainly correct on this point, but to the extent that he seeks to 
imply that one could extrapolate from this point to a conclusion regarding the 
place of international law in the law of the United States now, it seems to me 
that caution is necessary.  This follows because Article III expressly extends 
“[t]he judicial power [of the United States] . . . to all cases of admiralty and 
maritime jurisdiction.”16  Further, it seems clear that an important reason for 
vesting this class of jurisdiction in the federal courts was precisely to ensure 
that those courts would be able to hear prize cases.17  However, nothing in 
Article III purports to address aspects of customary international law unrelated 
to admiralty, and it therefore seems something of a leap to draw very much 
about the courts dealing with the former from the fact that they dealt with the 
latter. 
III.  JUDGES AND CASES AFFECTING FOREIGN RELATIONS 
The foregoing discussion does not address what I take to be Professor 
Sloss’s main claim in the paper: that the United States’ method of dealing with 
 
 11. Id. at 182. 
 12. MELVIN JACKSON, PRIVATEERS IN CHARLESTON 1793–1796, at 122–24 (1969). 
 13. Sloss, supra note 1, at 174. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 149, 195. 
 16. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 17. CASTO, supra note 6, at 40–41.  Indeed, Professor Casto argues that part of the argument 
for creating federal courts capable of exercising jurisdiction in prize cases was precisely that more 
was at stake in such cases than resolution of disputes about private rights; federal jurisdiction 
was, he asserts, thought necessary to ensure that the United States could avoid the national 
security problems that would be presented if prize law was not properly applied.  Id. 
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French prize cases demonstrates that what he calls “the exclusive political 
control thesis”—the argument that “the judiciary is barred from participating in 
foreign affairs decision making because the Constitution grants the political 
branches exclusive control over foreign policy”18—is false.19 
To the extent he means to argue that these cases show that the courts are 
not forbidden to decide cases having obvious and important effects on foreign 
and military affairs, he is clearly correct and is supported by cases decided 
long after the quasi-war with France. 
The first of these are The Prize Cases20 of 1863.  These cases were brought 
by persons either owning ships or owning cargo aboard ships which were taken 
as prizes by the U.S. Navy in 1861 as having violated the United States’ 
blockade of the Confederacy.21  The cases were heard together because all 
turned on the same basic issue: whether President Lincoln had the authority to 
declare a blockade of the Confederacy upon the outbreak of the Civil War in 
1861.22  In its decision, the Court did not simply defer to the President; it 
examined the facts and concluded that a civil war did in fact exist.23  To be 
sure, the opinion states that the President’s proclamation of a blockade was 
conclusive as to the existence of a war and the necessity of a blockade,24 but 
this statement comes after the Court has been at pains to establish a legal basis 
for classifying a civil war as a “war.”25  Further, the Court did not simply 
accept the Executive’s determination that the vessels and cargo were properly 
subject to capture.  It examined the circumstances of each case26 and in fact 
held that one of the claimants to part of a ship’s cargo was entitled to have the 
cargo restored.27  The question of the authority of the United States to impose a 
blockade in these circumstances clearly went to the foundations of the strategy 
of the United States in dealing with the Confederacy and with the contacts of 
foreign nationals with the Confederacy, but the Court did not simply rubber 
stamp the Executive. 
A second famous case illustrating these points is Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer.28  That well-known case arose from labor difficulties in 
the steel industry while the Korean War was taking place.29  President Truman, 
 
 18. Sloss, supra note 1, at 146. 
 19. Id. at 146, 194–96. 
 20. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863). 
 21. Id. at 636–38. 
 22. See id. at 665–66. 
 23. Id. at 666–70. 
 24. Id. at 670. 
 25. Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 666–70. 
 26. Id. at 674–82. 
 27. Id. at 681–82. 
 28. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 29. Id. at 582. 
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claiming concern that a steel strike could impede the war effort, purported to 
seize the steel mills, that is, to take control of them to maintain production; he 
had no statutory basis for doing so.30  Despite the President’s invocation of his 
war powers, however, and despite the potential effect on an ongoing foreign 
war, the Supreme Court examined the President’s claim of authority and held 
that he was without power to carry out the seizure.31 
Not only does other precedent support Professor Sloss’s conclusion, then, 
but as he points out, the role of the courts during the period he discusses was 
modest, at best.32  The decision to declare neutrality was made by the 
Executive and enacted into law by Congress; once the precise role the United 
States was to play had been decided by the political branches, the courts 
simply applied federal statutory law and well-established rules of admiralty 
law to the facts they found in individual cases.33  (Indeed, once it became clear 
that such questions would continue to arise about violations of American 
neutrality by French privateers, this judicial role seems almost inevitable.  The 
Attorney General was hardly well placed to make such inquiries, and the 
United States did not have the option of relying on the Navy to protect its 
neutrality—the Navy had no warships.34) 
A crucial point, I believe, is that while the cases Professor Sloss addresses 
certainly had an impact on the foreign affairs of the United States, they did not 
involve judicial determination of foreign policy.  Similarly, in The Prize Cases 
and Youngstown, the Court determined that the relevant policy had been set out 
in the Constitution but, again, did not purport to make policy itself.  This 
distinction between policy making and the application of policy seems to me to 
be what is crucial here. 
In this connection, it is helpful to remember the standards enunciated by 
Justice Brennan in his discussion of the political question doctrine in Baker v. 
Carr:35 
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is 
found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a 
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without 
an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or 
the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without 
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an 
 
 30. Id. at 585. 
 31. Id. at 582–89. 
 32. Sloss, supra note 1, at 146 (quoting CASTO, supra note 6, at 3). 
 33. See id. at 155–60. 
 34. MICHAEL J. CRAWFORD & CHRISTINE F. HUGHES, THE REESTABLISHMENT OF THE 
NAVY, 1787–1801: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW AND SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY (1995), available at 
http://www.history.navy.mil/biblio/biblio4/biblio4a.htm. 
 35. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
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unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; 
or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by 
various departments on one question.36 
The textual commitment in the Constitution most relevant to the cases 
Professor Sloss describes would seem to be Article III’s inclusion of admiralty 
cases within the judicial power of the United States.  Deciding them depended 
on “judicially discoverable and manageable standards”37—policy decisions 
made by the President and Congress in proclaiming the neutrality of the United 
States and in implementing that proclamation.  Since these cases required only 
the application of settled rules of law to facts as found by the court, there was 
no risk of showing disrespect for the political branches.  Nor was there any risk 
of different departments of the government taking different positions on the 
matter, since the Executive clearly intended to leave the matter to the courts. 
One may contrast these prize cases with other cases involving foreign 
affairs but where the Court held that it was required to defer to determinations 
made by the Executive.  These cases involved such subjects as recognition of 
governments38 or recognition of a state of belligerency.39  For such matters, 
even international law would not provide a court with standards sufficiently 
precise to apply as rules of law, and the questions would be ill-suited for 
judicial fact-finding.  Other cases involved issues concerning which legal rules 
could have been applied but were nonetheless resolved by the Court by 
deferring to the Executive.  For example, even though the Court has taken note 
of the fact that international law provided standards for resolving competing 
claims to sovereignty over land territory,40 the Supreme Court has held itself 
bound by executive determinations regarding sovereignty over territory, both 
in situations involving disputes between the United States and another 
sovereign41 and in cases where the United States itself has made no claim to 
sovereignty.42  These cases, however, reached the Supreme Court after the 
Executive, in diplomatic correspondence, had announced to other states its 
position on the territorial issues in question, and the Court in both cases 
expressly based its holding on the fact that the United States, through the 
Executive, had already spoken on the territorial matter.43 
In other words, Justice Brennan’s standards for the identification of 
political questions clearly have governed in foreign affairs cases in which the 
 
 36. Id. at 217. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See, e.g., United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 324 (1937). 
 39. See, e.g., The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 670 (1863). 
 40. Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415, 420 (1839). 
 41. Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 202 (1890). 
 42. Williams, 38 U.S. at 420–22. 
 43. Id. at 419–20; Jones, 137 U.S. at 202, 212–14, 216–24. 
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courts have simply deferred to the Executive.  In such cases, either there were 
simply no legal standards to apply or, by re-examining the issue, the Court 
would have been inserting itself into matters where the policy of the United 
States had already been communicated to foreign governments by the 
Executive.  Even if legal standards existed in this latter group of cases, the 
Court by addressing the matter would have risked the difficulties identified by 
Justice Harlan in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino:44 
  The dangers of such adjudication are present regardless of whether the 
State Department has . . . asserted that the relevant act violated international 
law.  If the Executive Branch has undertaken negotiations with [a] . . . country, 
but has refrained from claims of violation of the law of nations, a 
determination to that effect by a court might be regarded as a serious insult, 
while a finding of compliance with international law, would greatly strengthen 
the bargaining hand of the other state with consequent detriment to American 
interests. 
  Even if the State Department has proclaimed the impropriety of the [other 
country’s action], the stamp of approval of its view by a judicial tribunal, 
however impartial, might increase any affront and the judicial decision might 
occur at a time, almost always well after the taking, when such an impact 
would be contrary to our national interest.  Considerably more serious and 
far-reaching consequences would flow from a judicial finding that 
international law standards had been met if that determination flew in the face 
of a State Department proclamation to the contrary.  When articulating 
principles of international law in its relations with other states, the Executive 
Branch speaks not only as an interpreter of generally accepted and traditional 
rules, as would the courts, but also as an advocate of standards it believes 
desirable for the community of nations and protective of national concerns.  In 
short, whatever way the matter is cut, the possibility of conflict between the 
Judicial and Executive Branches could hardly be avoided.45 
 We see then that the Court has distinguished between cases involving 
application of policy in a foreign affairs matter and those involving the making 
of foreign policy.  The former include matters such as those described by 
Professor Sloss, where there were not only legal standards available to decide 
the cases, but the language of Article III itself made clear that the controversies 
were to be resolved by the judiciary.  The latter include cases where there were 
no legal standards to apply or where, even given such standards, the interests 
of specific foreign states were involved, and the Court could not act without 
risking contradicting the position taken by the Executive in its dealings with 
those states.  This distinction helps to explain the error in Justice Thomas’s 
 
 44. 376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
 45. Id. at 432–33. 
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opinion in the Hamdi case,46 to which Professor Sloss makes reference.47  
Hamdi was a case in which an American citizen, captured in Afghanistan by 
groups allied with the United States and subsequently surrendered to and 
detained by the United States, sought release from detention.48   The Court held 
that Hamdi was entitled to challenge his confinement in habeas proceedings; 
that in those proceedings the Government was obliged to put forward evidence, 
which would be disclosed to Hamdi, establishing that Hamdi was, in fact, an 
“enemy combatant”;49 and that Hamdi was entitled to an opportunity to rebut 
the Government’s showing.50 
Justice Thomas dissented from this conclusion, arguing that the detention 
fell “squarely within the Federal Government’s war powers, and [the Court 
lacked] the expertise and capacity to second-guess that decision.”51  He based 
this conclusion on the importance to the country of the protection of national 
security and the President’s primary responsibility in that regard, and on the 
courts’ lack of the information and expertise that would permit them to 
question the President’s judgment in national security matters.52  He further 
asserted that, “the decision whether someone is an enemy combatant is, no 
doubt, ‘delicate, complex, and involv[es] large elements of prophecy.’”53  He 
suggested that this complexity explained the fact that the Government had not 
provided the courts with the full criteria it used to classify individuals as 
enemy combatants.54 
Justice Thomas sought to bolster his argument through references to 
several cases.  Two are of particular importance.  He cited Ex parte Quirin55 
for the proposition that the Court in that case was “not . . . concerned with any 
question of the guilt or innocence of the petitioners.”56  He also quoted 
language from Moyer v. Peabody,57 a suit under what is now 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
brought by the president of a labor organization against a former governor of 
 
 46. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 579 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 47. Sloss, supra note 1, at 146. 
 48. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510–11 (plurality opinion). 
 49. For purposes of deciding the case, the Court’s plurality defined the term “enemy 
combatant” to mean at least someone who “was part of or supporting forces hostile to the United 
States or coalition partners in Afghanistan and who engaged in an armed conflict against the 
United States there.”  Id. at 516 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 50. Id. at 533–34. 
 51. Id. at 579 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 52. Id. at 580–83. 
 53. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 586 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. 
Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948)). 
 54. Id. 
 55. 317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
 56. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 584 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25). 
 57. 212 U.S. 78 (1909). 
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Colorado.58  The labor leader had been imprisoned for seventy-eight days in 
the course of the suppression of what the governor had proclaimed to be an 
insurrection;59 the labor leader had not been charged or brought before a judge 
during that period, and he had been released when the state government had 
determined that the insurrection had been suppressed.60  It was conceded, 
apparently, that the governor’s determination of the existence of an 
insurrection could not be challenged, and that the arrest had been made in good 
faith as part of the effort to suppress the disorder.61  The court held that a 
damage suit would not lie if good faith was assumed, in light of the necessity 
that the governor, as the man on the spot, deal with the immediate problem.62 
Finally, Justice Thomas sought to distinguish Ex parte Endo.63  That case 
held that a concededly loyal, law-abiding American citizen of Japanese descent 
could not be confined under the regulations imposed on those persons of 
Japanese ancestry held in camps after their removal from the West Coast.64  
The Court observed that the executive order that provided the legal basis for 
the removal of Japanese-descended persons spoke only of removal; it did not 
explicitly authorize detention.65  Further, the Court noted the order justified the 
measures it established as intending to prevent espionage and sabotage.66  
Since a person conceded to be loyal necessarily posed no threat of espionage or 
sabotage, the Court held that it could not read an order—which did not even 
explicitly authorize detention—as a basis for detention in such a case.67  
According to Justice Thomas, Endo was distinguishable because the 
Government in that case sought to justify the detention on the basis of reasons 
unrelated to the rationales set out in controlling legal instruments.68 
The errors in Justice Thomas’s analysis help to underline the argument 
Professor Sloss has made.  Preliminarily, the authority Justice Thomas cited in 
support of his argument in fact does not support it.  As Justice Scalia observed 
in his dissent in Hamdi, the Court could ignore questions of the defendants’ 
status in Quirin because there was no dispute as to their status; they were 
admitted to be German agents.69  However, as Justice Scalia further noted, the 
 
 58. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 587 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Moyer, 212 U.S. at 84). 
 59. Moyer, 212 U.S. at 82. 
 60. Id. at 82–83. 
 61. See id. at 82–84. 
 62. Id. at 84–85. 
 63. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 584–85 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 
(1944)). 
 64. Endo, 323 U.S. at 294–95, 297–301. 
 65. Id. at 300–01. 
 66. Id. at 297. 
 67. Id. at 297–302. 
 68. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 584–85 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 69. Id. at 571 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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issue in Hamdi was precisely that the detainee denied that he was an enemy 
combatant and sought to require the Government to at least permit him to 
refute the allegation—a situation very different from that in Quirin.70  Justice 
Scalia also showed that Moyer was distinguishable, involving as it did a suit 
for damages rather than a challenge to the confinement itself, and a relatively 
limited period of confinement71 as opposed to the indefinite confinement 
Hamdi faced.  He might have added that the Court in Moyer also suggested 
that the result in that case might have been different if the labor leader had 
been detained longer.72  Further, Justice Thomas’s attempt to distinguish Endo 
does not really work.  The difficulty is that the Government was represented 
before the Court by the Solictor General;73 surely that indicates that the 
Executive had determined that the petitioner’s continued detention was 
necessary to the war effort, whatever the language of the executive orders on 
which the Government’s actions were based.  And it was exactly that executive 
determination that the Endo court rejected. 
Justice Thomas is thus left with the argument that determining whether a 
person is an enemy combatant is somehow beyond judicial competence.  Yet 
he never explains why that should be so.  He states “the decision whether 
someone is an enemy combatant is, no doubt, ‘delicate, complex, and 
involv[es] large elements of prophecy.’”74  One could argue just as plausibly 
that that decision would have to be one that could be made on the basis of clear 
and explicit criteria, since it would have to be made by relatively low-ranking 
persons on the battlefield, and such persons would presumably require some 
sort of definite guidance from these criteria.  In any case, however, since the 
Government refused to inform the Court as to the criteria it employed,75 it is 
very unclear how Justice Thomas or anyone else could determine the ability of 
judges to apply those criteria. 
Certainly, the cases Professor Sloss discusses show the Court’s ability to 
address matters involving the use of force.  Among those cases were some 
requiring courts to decide whether a French privateer had increased its fighting 
strength while in an American port76 and the role played by each of two 
different alleged privateering vessels in the capture of a particular prize.77  It is 
not obvious why resolving such questions is inherently more judicial, or less 
 
 70. Id. at 571–72. 
 71. Id. at 572 n.4. 
 72. Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 85 (1909). 
 73. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 285 (1944). 
 74. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 586 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting Chi. & S. 
Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948)). 
 75. Id. at 516 (plurality opinion). 
 76. See Moodie v. The Betty Cathcart, 17 F. Cas. 651 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 9742). 
 77. See Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133 (1795). 
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difficult, than determining whether a particular individual meets the criteria 
defining an enemy combatant. 
In short, Justice Thomas’s argument for judicial incapacity in foreign 
relations matters cannot be sustained in the face of the implications of the cases 
Professor Sloss has described. 
CONCLUSION 
The cases Professor Sloss has described render untenable any argument 
that cases affecting foreign relations are somehow off limits to the federal 
courts.  To be sure, cases requiring judges to, in effect, establish foreign policy 
may well not be appropriate for judicial resolution, but such cases form only a 
part of all those that could be said to affect foreign relations.  In particular, it 
would appear to be a quintessentially judicial task to decide cases requiring 
nothing more than resolving factual disputes on the basis of evidence and 
applying clear rules of decision to the facts so found.  If these conclusions fail 
to determine the answers to all questions raised when matters affecting foreign 
policy come before the courts, they at least show the mistakes of those who 
would simply bar the courthouse door to such cases. 
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